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ABSTRACT
Most small to medium health care organizations do not have the capability to address cyber incidents
within the organization. Those that do are poorly trained and ill equipped. These health care
organizations are subject to various laws that address privacy concerns, proper handling of financial
information, and Personally Identifiable Information. Currently an IT staff handles responses to these
incidents in an Ad Hoc manner. A properly trained, staffed, and equipped Cyber Incident Response Team
is needed to quickly respond to these incidents to minimize data loss, and provide forensic data for the
purpose of notification, disciplinary action, legal action, and to remove the risk vector. This paper1 will use
the proven Incident Command System model used in emergency services to show any sized agency can
have an adequate CIRT.
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1 Introduction
Many small to medium health care organizations often fail to see the need for a Computer
Incident Response Team (CIRT) or feel they do not have the resources needed to implement one.
This paper will address the need and justification for a CIRT as well as explain how to implement
one with limited resources.   First there will be a discussion considering the legal implications
which also addresses the ethical needs for protecting patient information including Personally
Identifiable Information (PII).  Subsequent to this a brief overview of the Incident Response
process will be given.  The following sections will describe the methodology, the Emergency
Services Incident Command System (ICS), followed by an adaption of the ICS to the CIRT.  The
paper ends with a discussion of the skill set required by CIRT members and the tools they will
need.
1 This work is partially supported by EPSCoR award EPS-0903833 from the National Science
Foundation (NSF) to the University of Hawaii, USA
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It is important to recognize that no institution is exempt from attack or compromise. In January
of 2012 the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) published its list of
emerging trends and threats for 2012 [ HYPERLINK \l "Pel12" 1 ].  The MS-ISAC lists the
following emerging trends and threats:
• Mobile devices and Applications – The use of mobile devices and applications continue
to grow.  As they grow so do the attacks and the attack vectors.
• Hacktivism – Attacks carried out by activist to send a political or social message.  Groups
include Anonymous and Lulz.
• Search Engine Optimization (SEO) Poisoning - Cyber criminals will take advantage of
the 24-hour news cycle to target visitors searching on the most popular keywords or sites
and infect users via sites designed to look like legitimate news services, Twitter feeds,
Facebook posts/emails, LinkedIn updates, YouTube video comments, and forum
conversations. We expect cyber criminals to take advantages of notable news events such
as the London Olympics, U.S. presidential elections, and Mayan calendar predictions.
• Social Engineering - The use of rogue anti-virus to entice users into clicking on malicious
links, fake registry cleanup, fake speed improvement software, and fake back-up software
mimicking popular personal cloud services.
• Advanced Persistent Threat - a long-term pattern of targeted hacking attacks using
subversive and stealthy means to gain continual, persistent exfiltration of intellectual
capital.
• Spear Phishing Attacks – These attacks are targeted at particular individual and appear to
be legitimate emails.  This attacks are typically conducted by a person seeking financial
gain, trade secrets or sensitive information
Each and every one of these threats has a human element to it. Humans unlike machines, do
make mistakes, are prone to errors, and can be coerced into giving out information that is
personal in nature or proprietary. Given all of this, there is no reason to believe that the number
of incidents will decline; in fact, given the ever increasing sophistication of the hackers it is
believed the number of incidents will increase 1].
In April of 2011 it was reported that since 2009, 10.8 million people have been affected by data
breaches according to The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  These breaches
occurred in 265 separate incidents [ HYPERLINK \l "How11" 2 ].  Incidents include things like
loss of equipment, improperly handling obsolete data, attack from a hacker, phishing, social
engineering, and infection via email or visiting a malicious web site. Once an incident occurs it is
critical that it be handled properly to determine the extent of the problem and to minimize the
impact.
The Information Technology (IT) group will typically focus on making the system operational
again. That is, they will rebuild the system, clean the system to remove the infection, restore the
system from backup, block the attacking vector, or a combination of these. There is much more
that is needed to properly handle, the incident and ensuing investigation; forensic data is required
to determine what data if any was taken, by whom, and how.   Obtaining the evidence allows the
organization to determine what entities have been affected.  Additionally, it addresses if there is
the need for personnel actions, if law enforcement should be involved, or both. This information
can then be used by the organization to patch holes; change polices; or fix the problem.
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For these reasons a dedicated Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT) is needed to properly
respond to incidents and gather evidence. A CIRT focuses on six functions Preparation,
Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, and Follow Up 3].  These functions will
assure a systematic and appropriate response enabling a rapid and thorough recovery, minimizing
the loss of data and downtime.   Following proper procedures will preserve system data such that
a forensic analysis can be done.  This analysis will provide details of how, when, where, and
what.  Knowing this the organization can prevent future incidents over the same attack vector and
detect evidence to support personnel and legal actions. This data is also necessary to support
reporting requirements to individuals as well as regulatory agencies. It is imperative that senior
management supports the effort and provides proper authority to operate the CIRT.
1.1 Background of the Study
Most health care organizations have implemented and installed preventive measures that include
firewalls at the border, Intrusion Protection System (IPS), host based Intrusion Detection System
(IDS), anti-virus software, WEB content filtering (i.e. WebSense), and switched networks
(segmenting functional groups).  End users have been trained in proper procedure and the
safeguarding of information.  Strong, effective, policies have been developed to protect
information.  Even with all of this protection, breaches, infections, and human errors will still
happen.  Equipment is lost, stolen, or misplaced.  Anti-virus software only detects 50% of all
viruses and is vendor dependent [ HYPERLINK \l "Vir12" 4 ]. New viruses are constantly being
developed and old ones are modified to avoid detection. Not only must the hospital protect
corporate data and systems, it must also protect industrial control systems, and the physical access
electronic.  Even the best protection plans can be breached.
When an incident is discovered in the current system an ad hoc response is executed.  System
administrators and technicians who are untrained in incident response will first attempt to get the
system operational before attempting to preserve evidence or determine the extent of the breach.
2 Legal and Ethical Implications
While many laws apply to computer crimes special attention must be given to the rights and
protections of the individual when responding to an incident. Of primary concern here are the 4th
amendment protections of the U.S. Constitution, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Each incident should be approached form the point of
view that a crime has been committed; this provides the highest level of diligence and assures
proper evidence gathering.  It is imperative that the rights of the individual be protected so as to
not violate due process.
Additionally, the responder must be aware of their responsibilities and limits; one could actually
face criminal or civil penalties or legal action if proper procedures are not followed. This section
will address these concerns. The content in this section is not meant to be an exhaustive
examination of the legal issues, it is meant to bring awareness about the laws involved.
2.1 HIPAA
The hospital is a covered entity under the HIPAA privacy rule.  As such the Protected Health
Information (PHI) of patients must be safeguarded and handled appropriately.  Improperly
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handing this information creates an incident.  PHI is any information that relates to the person’s
past, present and future health condition, the care received, or anything to do with payments.
Employment records are exempt 5].  There are no restrictions on de-identified information.
In general the data may be used and released to the individual; for treatment, payment, and health
care operations; for the public interest and benefit; and limited data sets where the PHI has been
removed.  In the case of the public interest or benefit, PHI may be released to law enforcement;
workers compensation; when there is a serious threat to health and safety; Health oversight
activities; Victims of abuse neglect or domestic violence; and for Public Health Activities [
HYPERLINK \l "HIP09" 6 ] .  PHI is not to be used for marketing or any other unauthorized
purpose.
2.2 HITECH Act
The HITECH Act was implemented as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009.  Under this act HIPAA was strengthened to include fines, and a data breach notification 7].
In order to determine if a breach actually occurred the Hospital must perform an investigation to
determine what data may have been breached.  Civil Penalties are listed in Table 1:
Table 1 – List of HITECH Civil Penalties [ HYPERLINK \l "HIP09" 6 ]
Violation category Each violation All such violations of an identical
provision in a calendar year
Did Not Know $100–$50,000 $1,500,000
Reasonable Cause $1,000–
$50,000
$1,500,000
Willful Neglect—Corrected $10,000–
$50,000
$1,500,000
Willful Neglect—Not
Corrected
$50,000 $1,500,000
2.3 Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The fourth amendment protections only apply in cases where law enforcement or the government
are involved 8].  Government involvement includes actions performed on behalf of a government
representative.  As an example of this, a system administrator can view the files on a server of a
user and there are no fourth amendment protections.  However, if a member of law enforcement
asks the same administrator to view those files the administrator is now working at the direction
of law enforcement and fourth amendment protections apply.  In this case a search warrant is
required.
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It should also be noted that there are no Fourth Amendment protections in all cases where the
government is involved.  For there to be a fourth amendment issue there must first be a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth amendment protects people not places.  Justice Stewart issuing the
majority opinion stated: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." [
HYPERLINK \l "Joh67" 9 ] There are also no fourth amendment protections for items that
are in plain view.
In the age of high technology with enhanced viewing capabilities the question of using thermal
imaging devices, highly sensitive listening systems, Satellite imagery, etc. have come into
question.  In KYLLO V. UNITED STATES 10] Kyllo held that the use of a thermal imaging
camera to detect heat emanating from the home was a violation of the fourth amendment.  In this
case Agent William Elliott used an infrared camera from the public street to scan the residence to
detect the use if high intensity lights in an indoor marijuana growing operation. The government
argued that the camera only measured the IR coming from the part of the structure that was in
plain view and thus did not violate any rights.  However, the justices applied Katz to this ruling
stating,  “We rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where
the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone
booth. “  In concluding Justice Scalia stated “Where, as here, the Government uses a device that
is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”
Interestingly in DOW CHEMICAL CO. v. UNITED STATES [ HYPERLINK \l "Bur86" 11 ]
the courts found that the use of aerial photography was acceptable: The Court notes that EPA did
not use "some unique sensory device that, for example, could penetrate the walls of buildings and
record conversations." Nor did EPA use "satellite technology" or another type of "equipment not
generally available to the public."
For the incident responder at this company fourth amendment rights are not of much concern
unless law enforcement or the government are involved.  In those cases it the responder needs to
be aware of these restrictions and assure that law enforcement is acting appropriately.   It is
imperative that the employees react appropriately to request from law enforcement; should there
be questions or issues the request should be forwarded to the legal department and senior
management.
2.4 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
This is the first law specifically targeting computers and computer systems. The law targets
systems under direct control of a federal entity, financial institution, or computers involved in
commerce. This law made it a crime to gain unauthorized access to computer system to gain
information concerning national security, financial records, or information from any agency
within United States government. Originally passed in 1984 this law has seen several revisions.
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) covers crimes where the perpetrator has
“knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access,” 12].  It is
generally accepted that without authorization pertains to outsiders (hackers) while exceeding
authorized access applies to insiders.  The CFAA covers seven areas:
• obtaining national security information
• compromising confidentiality
• trespassing in a government computer
• accessing to defraud and obtain value
• damaging a computer or information
• trafficking in passwords
• threatening to damage a computer
The incident responder needs to be highly cognizant and fully aware if this law for two reasons.
The responder must assure that they do not break the law by exceeding their authority or
authorized access.  Secondly, the responder must be able to identify potential acts of criminal
activity.
2.5 Electronic Communications Privacy Act
2.5.1 THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
This law deals with the “Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications”
as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (Title I) (United States Code: Title 18,CHAPTER 119); Title I
of this law prohibits the interception of electronic communications. It also prohibits the use and
manufacture of devices intended to intercept electronic communications. However as with most
laws there are exceptions; the law provides Internet Service Providers (ISP) with the authority to
intercept communications “in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service”. This law also provides procedures
for law enforcement in the event that surveillance of electronic communications is required. It
also prohibits the use of illegally obtained information as evidence. This law was originally
passed in 1986.
2.5.2 STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
18 U.S.C. § 2701-12 (Title II) covers “Stored wire and electronic communications and
transactional records access” (United States Code: Title 18, CHAPTER 121). This law addresses
unauthorized access (including privilege escalation) for users who “…obtains, alters, or prevents
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage”. This
law also has exceptions allowing the owner of the system for maintenance, backups, and other
needed services. Of interest in this section is that if the owner the system finds evidence of “…an
emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person” or in cases of child
exploitation. This law was originally passed in 1986.
2.6 Security Breach Notification
According to The National Council of State Legislatures “Forty-six states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation
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requiring notification of security breaches involving personal information.” [ HYPERLINK \l
"Nat12" 13 ].  The importance here is that the organization must determine what data was
breached and whom notification must go to.  It is in the best interest of the organization to keep
the number of notifications minimal to reduce cost and maintain a good reputation.
3 Cyber Incident Defined
NIST Special Publication 800-61 states, “A computer security incident is a violation or imminent
threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer
security practices.” For the purposes of this plan an incident will also be defined as any illegal
activity involving Hospital computers, data or both.  This definition assumes that adequate
polices are in place to protect the intellectual property of the organization; the PII of employees,
customers, and partners; and Protected Health Information (PHI) of patients.
Incidents are created when events are triggered that give an indication of an adverse action.
Events are things like IDS signature triggers, anti-virus detection, firewall detecting a host going
to a known malicious domain, a phishing email is opened, or a firewall blocking a connection
attempt. Even something like a “slow computer” is an event. Not all events produce incidents
some are simply false positives. An example would be a web filter blocking certain content on a
web page.  For example, a user visits a legitimate site like cnn.com; on that page are various
advertisements and links that redirect the user to other web sites.  If the browser attempts to pre-
fetch the links and resolve them it may appear an end user attempted to access an unauthorized
web site.  In reality, the user did no such thing.
Incidents can occur at random times and there can be multiple incidents occurring at the same
time.   The complexity of the incident can also vary as can the duration.   A simple virus infection
may only require cleaning the host while a data breach or discovery of illegal activity may take an
extensive investigation and lengthy remediation.  Finally, it is entirely possible to have multiple
incidents that are all connected and interrelated.  As can be seen, the response to the incident may
vary in size, scope, and necessary resources.  The incident response team needs the ability to
maintain control and grow as the incident grows.
In addition to the typical cyber incident (i.e. hacking, malware, data loss) there are also the
response to physical attacks.  These include things like theft, fire, flood, building collapse, bomb
threats, etc.
4 Incident Response Procedure
When responding to an incident it is important to only tell people who have a need to know about
the incident. It is possible that an insider is violating law or policy.  Allowing them to know they
are being watched or investigated gives them the opportunity to destroy valuable evidence.
Throughout the process take good notes.
4.1 Preparation
In the preparation phase user expectations are set, as well as assuring system administrators are
properly prepared.  This is also the place where polices are set for the IRT to include the scope,
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responsibilities, when to call executives management and when to call law enforcement.  This
plan in fact is part of the preparation phase.
As part of the preparation it is imperative that a logon warning banner be placed on all systems.
This banner not only sets the expectation that end users will be monitored but it also serves notice
that there is no expectation of privacy.  By so doing, it makes the task of analyzing events much
easier as it removes the need to get approvals from senior management.
Also addressed here is the need to notify law enforcement and when.  There are times when Law
enforcement must be notified, for example when there is a serious safety or life threat to the
general public, in cases of child pornography, in cases of potential abuse to name a few.  There
are also reasons not to involve law enforcement.  In so doing the organization loses control of the
case; in fact there are now two cases with different objectives.  The organization wishes to get
systems back on line and operational while law enforcement wishes to gather evidence and
prosecute a crime.  In this case, the hospital also risks equipment seizure by the authorities.
Finally, it may be desirable not to report the issue to eliminate negative publicity.
Policy must also be developed for critical systems such that there are regular backups.  This will
allow for restoration of the system should a compromise occur.
4.2 Identification
The goal here is to examine the events, analyze them, and determine if there is an incident.  As
mentioned previously, not all events are incidents.  Examples of this are phishing emails that are
not opened, a user on a Linux system surfing to a web site with a known windows exploit, and a
large increase in ftp traffic that is authorized.
4.3 Containment
The purpose of this phase is to eliminate further damage.  There is the short term goal and the
long term goal.  In the short term the desire is to stop communications with the hacker, botnet, or
other external entity.  Additionally, the system needs to be isolated to stop the spread of the virus
or malware.  Some methods of doing this are to unplug the network cable, disable the switch port,
put in ACLs on routers or firewalls, and as a last resort unplug the power.  Unplugging the system
is not advised as this results in the loss of critical data and evidence concerning the running state
of the system.  Most importantly, try to keep a low profile, do not let the attacker now that you
have discovered their activity.
Also at this time make a system image to include the file system, and memory. When performing
forensic analysis later always use a copy of these images.  Keep the original pristine for evidence
purposes.  Take pictures of the area and the current state of the screen.
Long term containment involves applying patches to the affected system and other similar
systems.  Consider changing passwords and adding firewall rules. Remove any accounts that
were used by the attacker and shutdown hacker processes.  Subsequent to these actions the virus
or malware must be eradicated.
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4.4 Eradication
During eradication the system is cleaned and attacker artifacts are removed.  This is where the
forensic analysis will help.  If the malware can be identified a simple search on the internet will
reveal the characteristics of the malware. It may be necessary to use a VM or sand box to run the
malware and observe what it is doing.
Find the most recent clean backup to restore the system.  This backup should also be checked for
the presence of the malware or attacker.  If a rootkit was installed this will modify the operating
system itself, in this case reformat the hard drive and reinstall the operating system.  Once the
system is restored perform a vulnerability scan using Nessus and patch all vulnerabilities.
4.5 Recovery
Prior to putting the system back into production check the operation of the system against the test
plan and baseline documentation.  This should be done by the system administrator and the owner
of the system. The owner of the system makes the final decision on putting the system back into
production.  Once in production monitor the system closely and check carefully for signs of re-
compromise.
4.6 Follow Up
In the follow up phase the lessons learned are documented.  A report is generated detailing how
the attacker got in, what was done, how the issue was found, and what was done to fix it.  It
should also include recommendations to prevent future attacks by the same method.
4.7 Seven Deadly Sins
1. Failure to report or ask for help
2. Incomplete or nonexistent notes
3. Mishandling or destroying Evidence
4. Failure to create working images
5. Failure to contain or eradicate
6. Failure to prevent re-infection
7. Failure to apply lessons learned.
5 Methodology
Responding to cyber incidents is much like responding to a fire or medical emergency.  In all
cases the first responders must assess the situation, determine what resources may be needed,
evaluate the severity of the situation, determine a strategy and tactics, and finally assure safe
operations.  The fire and emergency services have been responding to emergencies for many
decades and have developed very good procedures and methods for doing so. The fire service
uses an Incident Command System (ICS), which is proven and can be easily adapted for use in
cyber incident response. The ICS is designed to handle incidents of all sizes and complexity and
can grow and shrink as the incident grows and shrinks.
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5.1 The Incident Command System (ICS)
The fire service has a well-designed and proven system that is used for responding to various
incidents.  Cyber incidents can be thought of as fires within computer systems and networks.   As
such, it is a simple task to adapt the ICS to cyber incidents.
The ICS was developed in the 1970’s in response to several catastrophic fires in the urban
interface in California 14]. This system is designed to allow inter-agency operation for incidents
small to large and complex. The ICS is based on following 14 management characteristics that
provide strength and efficiency to the total system [ HYPERLINK \l "FEM12" 15 ].
• Common Terminology – Assures that all participants are using the proper
terminology for incident response and required resources.
• Modular Organization – This allows for a compartmentalized approach that allows
resources or functions to be brought in based on the complexity and severity of the
incident.
• Management by Objectives – Establishes all-encompassing objectives and goals
• Incident Action Planning – Provides a centralized approach to the planning of the
response to the incident as well as setting priorities.
• Manageable Span of Control - Span of control defines how many people (or things)
each individual can manage.  The typical range is 3 to 7 with 5 being optimal.
• Incident Facilities and Locations – Numerous and varied facilities may be needed for
incident, these include command posts, staging areas, rest areas, etc.
• Comprehensive Resource Management – This means to maintain a comprehensive
view of resource utilization.  Resources in this case include equipment and personnel.
• Integrated Communications – Establishes a common communication system to
address the equipment, systems, and protocols necessary to achieve integrated voice
and data communications.
• Establishment and Transfer of Command – In the beginning of any incident
command (who is n charge?) must be established.  As the incident grows it may be
necessary to transfer the command, this requires a briefing that includes the current
status, the plan, and other important information
• Chain of Command and Unity of Command – The chain of command assures that
subordinates report to supervisors.  The concept actually comes form the military
where it is not desirable to have privates reporting to generals.
• Unified Command – This is a concept that allows various agencies and entities with
different functional, geographical and legal authority to work together.
• Accountability – This is management of personnel and resources involved in the
incident.
• Dispatch/Deployment – Personnel and resources only respond when requested.
• Information and Intelligence Management – This is the process of gathering,
analyzing, assessing, sharing, and managing incident-related information and
intelligence.
The incident command sections are defined as follows 15]:
• Command – Incident Commander (IC), Public Information Officer, Liaison Officer
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• Operations – Manages the tactical operations
• Planning – Resources, Situation, Documentation (Understanding the situation,
establish Priorities, and Strategy)
• Logistics – Communication, Food, Supply, Facilities
• Finance/Administration – Procurement, Compensations, Claims, Cost
• Intelligence/Investigations – Post incident investigation or intelligence gathering.
Not all components of the ICS are invoked at every emergency incident. Each component is
invoked as needed. It is possible that the incident commander will also be the operations chief,
planning chief, logistics chief, and finance chief.   To show how this works the following
scenarios are provided.
Scenario 1 – The incident is a small shed (10 ‘ x 10’) on fire with no other structures, vehicles, or
combustibles nearby.  A 5-man team with one truck arrives; the ranking officer (Lieutenant)
assesses the scene.  This officer assumes the role of incident commander (Command) and
develops a plan for fighting the fire (Planning).  He then directs the subordinates on the tactical
operations for extinguishing the fire (Operations).
Scenario 2 – A large two family home in a remote location is on fire.  The first arriving officer
(Lieutenant) takes command of the incident and establishes a command post. He notes the
structure is 50% involved and that additional resources will be required. The incident
commander (IC) calls for additional teams to be deployed.   As the teams arrive a higher-ranking
officer (Captain) takes over the command.  In so doing he is briefed by the lieutenant before
assuming command.  The lieutenant is then reassigned to the operations section where he will
lead an attack team.  Other teams are assembled to supply water, and provide support for the
operations.  As this is a lengthy incident, the logistics section is established to provide
refreshments and food.
No two emergencies are alike; it is possible that the emergency incident may also require law
enforcement, hazardous materials or environmental experts, medical, heavy construction, or any
other numerous resources. It should be noted that even if a chief is called in by captain or
lieutenant the chief does not have to take over control of the incident.  The chief can act in an
advisory role. As can be seen, this model allows for the expansion and inclusion of these
resources as needed.    Additionally, recognizing the potential need for these resources allows for
pre-planning and establishing contacts.
5.2 Converting the ICS to Cyber Space
To convert the ICS from the fire service to the cyber world is a relatively straightforward process.
Of the 14 management principles 3 are modified slightly
• Incident Facilities and Locations – When responding to cyber incidents the need for a
well-known command post, staging areas, rest areas, etc. are not needed.  However, there
is a need for secured workspaces, forensics labs, and other such facilities. Additionally, it
is critical that a primary incident responder be assigned.
• Integrated Communications – A communication system may or may not be required
depending on the type of incident and the sensitivity of the data.  The plan should
however address the need for multiple communication mediums.  That is, if the system
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under attack is the phone systems or the email system there needs to be another means of
communication available.   This is also dependent upon the size of the geographic area
covered.
• Dispatch/Deployment – It may be necessary to send incident responders to outreach
locations or remote sites.  In this case there must be control of who is sent where, with
what resources and mission assignments.
As with the management functions the sections are very straightforward as well.   In this section
the various roles will be spelled out as they pertain to cyber incident response.
Command – The Incident Commander (IC) is responsible for managing the incident from start to
finish.  Transfer of authority for a multi-day incident is not required.  The individual responsible
for the response will be available 24 X 7, however they are not required to be on site at all times.
The Public Information Officer will be utilized only on breaches that involve outside agencies or
the public.  The Liaison Officer is typically not utilized.  The function of this officer is to
facilitate communications between agencies and leverage outside resources.   The liaison officer
may be needed in cases where law enforcement is required or coordination between partner
organizations is required.
• Operations – Manages the tactical operations
• Planning – Resources, Situation, Documentation (Understanding the situation, establish
Priorities, and Strategy)
• Logistics – Communication, Food, Supply, Facilities
• Finance/Administration – Procurement, Compensations, Claims, Cost
• Intelligence/Investigations – Post incident investigation or intelligence gathering.
•
To consider how this works in the realm of cyber incidents examine the following scenarios.
Scenario 1:  The corporate anti-virus console has detected a piece of malware on an end users
computer.  The system administrator notifies the IRT who sends a member of the team out to
investigate.  The responder finds the malware, examines the system for compromise, and
determines if further action is required.  He reports back to the manger who concurs.  The system
is then cleaned by the IT department and reinstalled.
Scenario 2: While reviewing log files the network administrator notices that one workstation is
downloading a large amount of data to an external IP address.   The incident response team gets
the log files and begins analyzing them.  They find that the files are being sent to a personal
Roadrunner account.  This could now be an indication of a policy violation or illegal activity.  To
assure the investigation is handled properly the legal department is activated along with HR
department. The CEO is informed of the downloads and based on the size they could potentially
contain sensitive information.  As the team continues to dig the find that one of the people in the
engineering department is downloading facility information so that he can work on this at home.
While not illegal, this is a violation of policy and will be handled by the supervisor and HR.
Scenario 3:  This scenario is the same as the previous only this time the employee is a clerk who
is downloading patient PPI.  The PPI includes names, Social Security numbers, addresses, billing
information (to include credit card numbers) and treatments.   In this case not only has corporate
policy been violated but laws may also have been broken.   Addressing this incident requires that
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Legal, HR, Finance, facility security, and senior management be involved.  Senior managers may
decide to call in law enforcement to assure that data and evidence are collected and gathered in
accordance with proper procedures.   As the investigation progresses it is determined that the
employee is taking the data and selling to identify thieves.   This now constitutes a data breach,
which requires the Public Information officer involvement.  In a coordinated effort the employee
will be arrested, accounts will be disabled, facility access removed, and the employee will be
fired.  Subsequently, press releases will be written and affected end users will be notified of the
breach by the Public Information office.  In this incident the CEO will be called in and will take
over control.  In so doing the ISO well have a meeting with the CEO who will be briefed on the
status and the plan.  The ISO will then focus on remediation and forensics while the CEO directs
others in preparing the legal, HR, and Public Information responses.
Using the above three scenarios one can easily see how the incident response can grow and be
managed in an orderly fashion. It should be noted that even though the CEO is called into an
incident the CEO does not have to take over control of the incident. His function could be an
advisory one.  In the case of all serious incidents the CEO should be notified. One should also
consider the situation where there are multiple incidents occurring at the same time.  Using this
model a unified command post is established with individual teams reporting back.  Again, the
system can grow as needed.
6 Incident Response Team
6.1 IRT Member Skills
Incident Responders should hold at least one reputable forensics certification available from
organizations like SANS, GIAC Certified Forensics Analyst (GCFA), or International
Association of Computer Investigative Specialist (IACIS) Certified Forensic Computer Examiner
(CFCE).  In the opinion of the author, the independent certifications are better than the ones
offered up by vendors like EnCase.
6.2 Lab
When building an incident response laboratory one needs to assure that the facility is secure and
only used by authorized individuals.  All investigations should be treated as if they will be used
for the enforcement of a crime. The key is to remember the need to know rule, thus restricting
investigators to knowledge of only their own investigations.  Some things to consider are:
• Locking evidence cabinets.
• Locking room
• TEMPEST Certified – Not necessary, but nice to have.  In this regard it may be
advantageous to implement some of the features to make the investigative room
more secure.
• Workstations with ample work space (approximately 150 sq. ft.)
• Limited view of workstation screen.
• Budgeting for additional systems each year to maintain compatibility with
hardware and software advancements
• An inventory of Operating Systems to include old and obsolete systems.
• Regulated Access.
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There should be adequate numbers of forensics workstations.  It is recommended that the
Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device (FRED) from Digital Intelligence be used as the forensic
workstation. More information can be found at http://www.digitalintelligence.com/products/fred/.
Figure 2 depicts an image of the FRED.  As can be seen this is not a typical workstation and has
many features needed to perform a forensics investigation. In Addition to the FRED the system
also needs a copy of Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) for performing the investigations and analysis. The
FRED cost $6,000 and FTK for one year is $4,000.
Figure 1 Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device [ HYPERLINK \l "Dig12" 16 ] (FRED)
6.3 Jump Kit
The Jump Kit contains the tools and utilities needed to respond to an incident. The jump kit
should be stored in a small suitcase or backpack and it should contain the following equipment:
Table 2 Jump Kit Contents
Item Cost Purpose
Traveler's Choice Rome 29 in.
Hardshell Spinner Suitcase
$90 Used to hold and transport Jump Kit
Equipment
Dell Latitude E6220 $800 Laptop to be used for Data Gathering and
analysis tools
Cat 6 Network cables (including
crossover)
$50
Cisco 2960CG-8TC-L Gigabit
Switch with sfp Fiber uplink
$700 Used to allow sniffing of the network activity.
Peripheral cables—USB, Firewire,
parallel, serial, console
$100 Used to connect to various devices and
provide data transfers.
BackTrack Live DVD $0 Contains a clean version of Linux with many
pre-installed analysis and forensic tools
Notebooks, pens, pencils $50 Notebooks should have numbered pages.
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Item Cost Purpose
Camera $100 Used to photograph area and state of the
computer upon arrival.
1 Terabyte  Hard Drive $120 Used to get forensic images.
UltraBlock eSATA IDE-SATA
Write Blocker
$400 Used during the acquisition of an image to
prevent writing to the original hard disk.
Flashlight $20
Screwdrivers, Pliers, small
Wrenches
$100 Used to open cases and systems.  May be
needed for disconnecting or removing system.
Call List A list with the names and contact information
of all Team Members, Additional Resources,
and outside contacts.
In addition to this the kit shall also have a Corporate Credit Card with $5,000 limit.
6.4 Recommend Software tools.
a) Linux/Unix tools
• R-Linux
• BackTrack
• dd command
• SleuthKit
• WireShark
b) Windows Tools
• VMWare Player
• ProDiscover
• Hex Edit
• WireShark
• steghide
• stegdetect
• Sawmill
• FINALeMAIL
6.5 Additional Resources
6.5.1 HUMAN RESOURCES.
The HR department should be involved in cases of policy violation, illegal activity, or both.
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6.5.2 FINANCE
Will be used in the event resources, supplies, or equipment must be purchased
6.5.3 LEGAL
The Legal department should be contacted and involved in cases of data breach, illegal activity,
and when legal questions arise.
6.5.4 CEO
It is imperative that the CEO be involved in major incidents; CAT 1, CAT 2, and CAT 3 from
Table 2.  These incidents have a severe impact on the operation and reputation of the organization
as well as legal and personnel implications.
6.5.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY
Physical Security needs to be involved for cases of theft, unauthorized physical access, and cases
where employees are to be escorted off the premises.
6.5.6 PUBLIC RELATIONS
Public relations must get involved when there will be a press release or breach notifications.
6.5.7 LAW ENFORCEMENT
In the event that there is evidence of a crime the agency should have law enforcement contacts
documented.  Law enforcement should only be brought in by the legal department or the CEO;
unless the crime involves those individuals.
7 Initial Reporting.
When reporting an incident the following information is required. Sample form in Appendix
• Point of contact information including name, telephone, and email address
• Incident Category Type (e.g., CAT 1, CAT 2, etc., see table)
• Incident date and time
• Source IP, port, and protocol (If Known)
• Destination IP, port, and protocol (If Known)
• Location of the system(s) involved in the incident
• Method used to identify the incident (e.g., IDS, audit log analysis, system administrator,
end-user complaint)
• Description of the Incident.
8 Classifying and Prioritizing Incidents
i. The US-CERT lists that reporting categories for US Agencies along with reporting time
requirements [17].  A category 1 incident carries the highest priority while a category 6
carries the lowest priority.  It is useful to use these categories as a guide to assigning
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urgency remembering this is just a guideline.  These categories are listed and described in
table 3. It should be noted that for purposes of this organization CAT 3 and CAT 4 have
been exchanged.
Table 3 Incident Categories
Category Name Description
CAT 1 Unauthorized
Access
In this category an individual gains logical or physical access
without permission to a federal agency network, system,
application, data, or other resource
CAT 2 Denial of
Service (DoS)
An attack that successfully prevents or impairs the normal
authorized functionality of networks, systems or applications by
exhausting resources. This activity includes being the victim or
participating in the DoS
CAT 3 Improper
Usage
A person violates acceptable computing use policies.
CAT 4 Malicious
Code
Successful installation of malicious software (e.g., virus, worm,
Trojan horse, or other code-based malicious entity) that infects an
operating system or application.
CAT 5 Scans/Probes/
Attempted
Access
This category includes any activity that seeks to access or identify
a computer, open ports, protocols, service, or any combination for
later exploit. This activity does not directly result in a compromise
or denial of service
CAT 6 Investigation Unconfirmed incidents that are potentially malicious or
anomalous activity deemed by the reporting entity to warrant
further review.
Table 4 prioritizes the various systems and identities the risk. Criticality is a measure of the
importance to the operation of the hospital.  Risk is a measure of how susceptible the system is.
Table 4 – System Criticality
System Function Criticalit
y
Risk
Email Used for internal communications between staff.
External communications to vendors and partners.
PPI and PHI are not authorized using email. The
email server is located in the DMZ and is running as a
bastion host.  The only services ports open are port 25
low high
Patient Care The patient care system includes patient check in, as
well as all data pertaining to treatments.  This
includes scheduled services (i.e. X-Ray, Physical
therapy, Lab, etc), prescribed medications, special
instructions.  Medications
high low
Finance and
Accounting
The Finance and accounting systems interface with
numerous insurance companies as well as the credit
card processing facility
medium medium
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System Function Criticalit
y
Risk
Human
Resources
Human Resources systems contain the information on
all employees including their PPI, training,
qualifications, work schedules.
low low
Public Web
Server
The Public Web server only provides basic
information about the hospital and its services. There
is no sensitive information on this system – the
system does not process payments
low medium
Facilities The facilities engineering system monitors and
controls the environmental systems within the
hospital.  It also monitors fuel levels, generator status,
and levels of oxygen in the storage tanks.  It is not
connected to he internet, there is a dial up system for
remote management.
high low
Desk Top Desktop systems are in use by ordinary users who
may not recognize the risk or attempted attack.
Typically, an attack on a desktop system will enable
an attacker to gain access to other resources.
medium high
Using tables 3 and 4 as a guide the analysts can now score incidents.  Start by assigning values as
follows high=1, medium=2, low =3; CAT 1=1, CAT 2=2, etc.  Criticality to the operation is of
more importance than the risk or exposure.  To obtain the score for the incident use the formula
score = CAT + (2 x Criticality) + risk.  These scores can then be used as a guide in prioritizing
incidents.
9 Conclusion
An incident response team is vital to the operation of any organization.  The organization does
not necessarily need all of the capabilities for a complete response, but it should know where to
turn for help when an incident occurs.  Realizing that a cyber-incident is actually a cyber-
emergency, one can then apply the proven techniques of emergency response and emergency
management to the cyber incident.
The Incident Command System (ICS) has been in use in the Emergency services field since the
1970’s .  This model can be easily adapted to cyber incidents to allow a proper response to any
size incident. The major emphasis must be on planning, this allows the organization to determine
its abilities and limitations as well as identify additional resources that may be needed.  Proper
planning will allow the organization to respond rapidly, properly, and provide for the proper
mitigation and analysis.  The time to plan is before the incident, not during.
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